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FIFTY SHADES OF BLACK
ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
Abstract. The paper proposes a new and systematic approach to the so-
called black box group methods in computational group theory. As the starting
point of our programme, we construct Frobenius maps on black box groups
of untwisted Lie type in odd characteristic and then apply them to black
box groups X encrypting groups (P)SL2(q) in small odd characteristics. We
propose an algorithm constructing a black box field K isomorphic to Fq , and
an isomorphism from (P)SL2(K) to X. The algorithm runs in time quadratic
in the characteristic of the underlying field and polynomial in log q.
Due to the nature of our work we also have to discuss a few methodological
issues of the black box group theory.
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1. Introduction
Black box groups were introduced by Babai and Szemeredi [7] as an idealized
setting for randomized algorithms for solving permutation and matrix group prob-
lems in computational group theory. This paper belongs to a series of works aimed
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at development of systematic structural analysis of black box groups [11, 12, 13,
15, 16, 49, 50].
The principal results of this paper are concerned with construction of Frobenius
maps on black box Chevalley groups of untwisted type and odd characteristic, they
are stated and proven in Section 2.7.
In Section 4, these constructions are applied to prove Theorem 4.1 concerned
with recognition of black box groups (P)SL2(q) for q ≡ 1 mod 4 and q = pk for
some k > 1.
Our approach requires a detailed discussion of some methodological issues of
black box group theory; this discussion is spread all over the paper and is supported
by some “toy” mathematical results, such as Theorem 3.1 that provides recognition
of black box groups SL2(2
n) under a (rather hypothetical) assumption that we are
given an involution in the group.
2. Black box groups and their automorphisms
2.1. Axioms BB1 – BB3. A black box group X is a black box (or an oracle, or a
device, or an algorithm) operating with 0–1 strings of bounded length which encrypt
(not necessarily in a unique way) elements of some finite group G (in various classes
of black box problems the isomorphism type of G could be known in advance or
unknown). The functionality of a black box is specified by the following axioms,
where every operation is carried out in time polynomial in terms of log |G|.
BB1 X produces strings of fixed length l(X) encrypting random (almost) uni-
formly distributed elements from G; the string length l(X) is polynomially
bounded in terms of log |G|.
BB2 X computes, in time polynomial in l(X), a string encrypting the product
of two group elements given by strings or a string encrypting the inverse of
an element given by a string.
BB3 X compares, in time polynomial in l(X), whether two strings encrypt the
same element in G—therefore identification of strings is a canonical projec-
tion
X .........
pi
- G.
We shall say in this situation that X is a black box over G or that a black
box X encrypts the group G. Notice that we are not making any assumptions on
computability of the projection pi.
A typical example of a black box group is provided by a group G generated in a
big matrix group GLn(r
k) by several matrices g1, . . . , gl. The product replacement
algorithm [26] produces a sample of (almost) independent elements from a distri-
bution on G which is close to the uniform distribution (see a discussion and further
development in [5, 6, 17, 30, 37, 39, 41, 40, 42]). We can, of course, multiply, invert,
compare matrices. Therefore the computer routines for these operations together
with the sampling of the product replacement algorithm run on the tuple of gen-
erators (g1, . . . , gl) can be viewed as a black box X encrypting the group G. The
group G could be unknown—in which case we are interested in its isomorphism
type—or it could be known, as it happens in a variety of other black box problems.
2.2. Global exponent and Axiom BB4. Notice that even in routine examples
the number of elements of a matrix group G could be astronomical, thus mak-
ing many natural questions about the black box X over G—for example, finding
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the isomorphism type or the order of G—inaccessible for all known deterministic
methods. Even when G is cyclic and thus is characterized by its order, existing
approaches to finding multiplicative orders of matrices over finite fields are condi-
tional and involve oracles either for the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields
or for prime factorization of integers.
Nevertheless black box problems for matrix groups have a feature which makes
them more accessible:
BB4 We are given a global exponent of X, that is, a natural number E such that
it is expected that pi(x)E = 1 for all strings x ∈ X while computation of xE
is computationally feasible (say, logE is polynomially bounded in terms of
log |G|).
Usually, for a black box group X arising from a subgroup in the ambient group
GLn(r
k), the exponent of GLn(r
k) can be taken for a global exponent of X.
One of the reasons why the axioms BB1–BB4, and, in particular, the con-
cept of global exponent, appear to be natural, is provided by some surprising
model-theoretic analogies. For example, D’Aquino and Macintyre [29] studied non-
standard finite fields defined in a certain fragment of bounded Peano arithmetic;
it is called I∆0 + Ω1 and imitates proofs and computations of polynomial time
complexity in modular arithmetic. It appears that such basic and fundamental fact
as the Fermat Little Theorem has no proof which can be encoded in I∆0 + Ω1; the
best that had so far been proven in I∆0 + Ω1 is that the multiplicative group F∗p
of the prime field Fp has a global exponent E < 2p [29].
We shall discuss model theory and logic connections of black box group theory
in some details elsewhere.
2.3. Relations with other black box groups projects.
In this paper, we assume that all our black box groups
satisfy assumptions BB1–BB4.
We emphasize that we do not assume that black box groups under consideration
in this paper are given as subgroups of ambient matrix groups; thus our approach
is wider than the setup of the computational matrix group project [34]. Notice that
we are not using the Discrete Logarithm Oracles for finite fields Fq: in our original
setup, we do not have fields. Nevertheless we are frequently concerned with black
box groups encrypting classical linear groups; even so, some of our results (such
as Theorems 3.2 and 3.3) do not even involve the assumption that we know the
underlying field of the group but instead assume the knowledge of the characteristic
of the field without imposing bounds on the size of the field. Finally, in the case of
groups over fields of small characteristics we can prove much sharper results, see,
for example, Theorem 4.1. Here, it is natural to call characteristic p “small”, if it
is known and if a linear or quadratic dependency of the running time of algorithm
on p does not cause trouble and algorithms are computationally feasible.
So we attach to statements of our results one of the two labels:
• Known characteristic,
• Small characteristic.
Our next paper [15] is dominated by “known characteristic” results. In this one,
we concentrate on black box groups of known or small characteristics.
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2.4. Morphisms. Given two black boxes X and Y encrypting finite groups G and
H, correspondingly, we say that a map α which assigns strings from Y to strings
from X is a morphism of black box groups, if
• the map α is computable in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X) and l(Y ),
and
• there is an abstract homomorphism β : G → H such that the following
diagram is commutative:
X
α- Y
G
piX
?
.........
β- H
piY
?
.........
where piX and piY are the canonical projections of X and Y onto G and H,
correspondingly.
We shall say in this situation that a morphism α encrypts the homomorphism β.
For example, morphisms arise naturally when we replace a generating set for black
box group X by a more convenient one and start sampling the product replacement
algorithm for the new generating set; in fact, we replace a black box for X and deal
with a morphism Y −→ X from the new black box into X. Also, a black box
subgroup Z of X is a morphism Z ↪→ X.
Slightly abusing terminology, we say that a morphism α is an embedding, or an
epimorphism, etc., if β has these properties. In accordance with standard conven-
tions, hooked arrows
⊂ -
stand for embeddings and doubleheaded arrows
--
for epimorphisms; dotted arrows are reserved for abstract homomorphisms, includ-
ing natural projections
X .......
piX- pi(X);
the latter are not necessarily morphisms, since, by the very nature of black box
problems, we do not have efficient procedures for constructing the projection of a
black box onto the (abstract) group it encrypts.
We further discuss morphisms in Sections 2.6 and 3.4.
2.5. Shades of black. Polynomial time complexity is an asymptotic concept, to
work with it we need an infinite class of objects. Therefore our theory refers to
some infinite family X of black box groups (X of course varies from one black box
problem to another). For X ∈ X , we denote by l(X) the length of 0–1 strings
representing elements in X. We assume that, for every X ∈ X , basic operations
of generating, multiplying, comparing strings in X can be done in probabilistic
polynomial time in l(X). We assume that encryption of group elements in X is
sufficiently economical and l(X) is bounded by a polynomial in log |pi(X)|.
We also assume that the lengths logE(X) of global exponents E(X) for X ∈ X
are bounded by a polynomial in l(X).
Morphism X −→ Y in X are understood as defined in Section 2.4 and their
running times are bounded by a polynomial in l(X) and l(Y ).
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At the expense of slightly increasing X and its bounds for complexity, we can
include in X a collection of explicitly given “known” finite groups. Indeed, using
standard computer implementations of finite field arithmetic, we can represent ev-
ery group Y = GLn(Fpk) as an algorithm or computer routine operating on 0–1
strings of length l(Y ) = n2k log p. Using standard matrix representations for simple
algebraic groups, we can represent every group of points Y = G(Fpk) of a reductive
algebraic group G defined over Fpk as a black box Y generating and processing
strings of length l(Y ) polynomial in log |Fpk | and the Lie rank of Y . Therefore an
“explicitly defined” group can be seen a black box group, perhaps of a lighter shade
of black.
We shall use direct products of black boxes: if X encrypts G and Y encrypts H
then the black box X × Y generates pairs of strings (x, y) by sampling X and Y
independently, with operations carried out componentwise in X and Y ; of course,
X × Y encrypts G×H.
Figure 1. M.C. Escher, Day and Night, 1938
We feel that the best way to understand a black box group
G ff......... X
is a step-by-step construction of a chain of morphisms
G ff......... X ffff X1 ffff X2 ffff · · · ffff Xn ffff G
at each step changing the shade of black and increasing amount of information
provided by black boxes Xi.
Even in relatively simple black box problems we may end up dealing with a
sophisticated category of black boxes and their morphisms. Step-by-step trans-
formation of black boxes into “white boxes” and their complex entanglement is
captured well by Escher’s famous woodcut, Figure 1.
2.6. Automorphisms as lighter shades of black. The first application of the
“shadows of black” philosophy is the following self-evident theorem which explains
how an automorphism of a group can be added to a black box encrypting this
group.
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Theorem 2.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting a finite group G and assume
that each of k tuples of strings
x˜(i) = (x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
m ), i = 1, . . . , k,
generate X in the sense that the projections pi
(
x
(i)
1
)
, . . . , pi
(
x
(i)
m )
)
generate G.
Assume that the map
pi : x
(i)
j 7→ pi(x(i+1 mod k)j ), i = 0, . . . , k − 1, j = 1, . . . ,m,
can be extended to an automorphism a ∈ AutG of order k. The black box group Y
generated in Xk by the strings
x¯j =
(
x
(0)
j , x
(1)
j , . . . , x
(k−1)
j
)
, j = 1, . . . ,m,
encrypts G via the canonical projection on the first component
(y0, . . . , yk−1) 7→ pi(yo),
and possess an additional unary operation, cyclic shift
α : Y −→ Y
(y0, y2, . . . , yk−1, yk−1) 7→ (y1, y2, . . . , yk−1, y0)
which encrypts the automorphism a of G in the sense that the following diagram
commutes:
Y
α-- Y
G
?
.........
..........
a
- G
?
.........
A somewhat more precise formulation of Theorem 2.1 is that we can construct,
in polynomial in k and m time, a commutative diagram
(1)
X ffff
{pii }06i6k−1
Xk ff
δ ⊃ Y ..........
α
- Y
G
?
.........
ff........................
{ pi }1606k−1
Gk
?
........
ff........
d
G
?
.........
..........
a
- G
?
.........
where d is the twisted diagonal embedding
d : G −→ Gk
x 7→ (x, xa, xa2 , xak−1),
and pi is the projection
pi : G
k −→ G
(g0, . . . , gi, . . . , gk−1) 7→ gi.
Of course, this construction leads to memory requirements increasing by factor
of k, but, as our subsequent papers [15, 16] show, this is price worth paying. After
all, in most practical problems the value of k is not that big, in most interesting
cases k = 2.
A useful special case of Theorem 2.1 is the following result about amalgamation of
black box automorphisms, stated here in an informal wording rather than expressed
by a formal commutative diagram.
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Theorem 2.2. Let X be a black box group encrypting a group G. Assume that
G contains subgroups G1, . . . , Gl invariant under an automorphism α ∈ AutG and
that these subgroups are encrypted in X as black boxes Xi, i = 1, . . . , l, supplied
with morphisms φi : Xi −→ Xi which encrypt restrictions α |Gi of α on Gi.
Finally, assume 〈Gi, i = 1, . . . , l〉 = G.
Then we can construct, in polynomial in l(X) time, a morphism φ : X −→ X
which encrypts α.
2.7. Construction of Frobenius maps. We now use Theorem 2.1 to construct a
Frobenius map on a black box group X encrypting (P)SL2(q) with q ≡ 1 mod 4 and
q = pk for some k > 1. We make sure that the Frobenius map constructed leaves
invariant the specified Borel subgroup, thus giving us access to subtler structural
properties of the group.
We shall use the following result from [12].
Theorem 2.3 (Small characteristic). [12, Theorem 1.2] Let X be a black box group
encrypting (P)SL2(q), where q ≡ 1 mod 4 and q = pk for some k > 1. If p 6= 5, 7,
then there is a Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs in X strings u, h, n such
that there exists an (abstract) isomorphism
Φ : X −→ (P)SL2(q)
with
Φ(u) =
[
1 1
0 1
]
,Φ(h) =
[
t 0
0 t−1
]
,Φ(n) =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
,
where t is some primitive element of the field Fq. The running time of the algorithm
is quadratic in p and polynomial in log q.
If p = 5 or 7, and k has a small divisor `, the same result holds where the running
time is polynomial in log q and quadratic in p`.
In notation of Theorem 2.3, Theorem 2.1 immediately yields the following re-
markably useful result, see its extensions and applications in our subsequent papers
[15, 16].
Theorem 2.4 (Small characteristic). (Informal formulation) Let X be as in The-
orem 2.3. Then there is a Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs a map
X
φ-- X
that corresponds to the Frobenius automorphism a 7→ ap of the field Fq and leaves
invariant subgroups U and T and the elements u and w of X.
The running time of the algorithm is quadratic in p and polynomial in log q.
Proof. It suffices to observe that the action of the canonical Frobenius map
F :
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
7→
[
ap11 a
p
12
ap21 a
p
22
]
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on the preimages of u¯, w¯, h¯ in PSL2(q) and their images under the powers of the
Frobenius map looks like that:[
1 1
0 1
]F i
=
[
1 1
0 1
]
,[
0 1
−1 0
]F i
=
[
0 1
−1 0
]
,[
tp
l
0
0 tp
−l
]F i
=
[
tp
l+i (mod k)
0
0 tp
−l−i (mod k)
]
=
[
tp
l
0
0 tp
−1
]pi
.
Therefore the black box group Y is generated in the direct product Xk by elements
u¯ = (u, u, . . . , u)
w¯ = (w,w, . . . , w)
h¯ = (h, hp, . . . , hp
k−1
)
fits precisely in the construction described in Theorem 2.1.
It remains to notice that, by nature of its construction, the map α in Theorem 2.1
leaves invariant elements u¯, w¯ and the torus T¯ generated by h¯ and hence leaves
invariant the unipotent group U¯ = 〈u¯T¯ 〉 and the Borel subgroup U¯ T¯ of Y . 
Actually we have a more general construction of Frobenius maps on all untwisted
Chevalley groups over finite field of odd characteristic; unlike Theorem 2.4, it does
not use unipotent elements.
Theorem 2.5 (Known characteristic). Let X be a black box group encrypting a
simple Lie type group G = G(q) of untwisted type over a field of order q = pk for p
odd (and known) and k > 1. Then we can construct, in time polynomial in log |G|,
• a black box Y encrypting G,
• a morphism X ←− Y , and
• a morphism φ : Y −→ Y which encrypts a Frobenius automorphism of G
induced by the map x 7→ xp on the field Fq.
Proof. The proof is based on two applications of Theorem 2.2. First we consider
the case when X encrypts PSL2(Fq). Using the standard technique for dealing with
involution centralizers, we can find in X a 4-subgroup V ; let E be the subgroup in
G = PSL2(q) encrypted by V . Since all 4-subgroups in PSL2(Fq) are conjugate to
a subgroup in PSL2(Fp), we can assume without loss of generality that E belongs
to a subfield subgroup H = PSL2(Fp) of G and therefore E is fixed by a Frobenius
map F on G. Now let e1 and e2 be two involutions in E, and C1 and C2 maximal
cyclic subgroups in their centralizers in G; notice that C1 and C2 are conjugate by
an element from H and are F -invariant.
It follows from the basic Galois cohomology considerations that F acts on C1
and C2 as power maps αi : c 7→ cp for p ≡  mod 4. If now we take images Xi of
groups Ci, we see that the morphisms φi : x 7→ xp of Xi encrypt restrictions of
F to Ci. Obviously, X1 and X2 generate a black box Y −→ X, and we can use
Theorem 2.2 to amalgamate φ1 and φ2 into a morphism φ which encrypts F .
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As usual, for groups SL2(q) the same result can be achieved by essentially the
same arguments as for PSL2(q). Moving to other untwisted Chevalley groups, we
apply amalgamation to (encryptions of) restrictions of a Frobenius map on G to
(encryptions in X) of a family of root (P)SL2-subgroups Ki in G forming a Curtis-
Tits system in G (and therefore generating G). Black boxes for Curtis-Tits system
in classical groups of odd characteristic are constructed in [11], in exceptional groups
in [14]. This completes the proof. 
3. Oracles and revelations
In this section, we revise the classification of black box group problems and
briefly discuss the role of “oracles”.
3.1. Monte-Carlo and Las Vegas. This is a brief reminder of two canonical
concepts for the benefit of those readers who came from the pure group theory
rather than computational group theory background.
A Monte-Carlo algorithm is a randomized algorithm which gives a correct output
to a decision problem with probability strictly bigger than 1/2. The probability
of having incorrect output can be made arbitrarily small by running the algorithm
sufficiently many times. A Monte-Carlo algorithm with outputs “yes” and “no” is
called one-sided if the output “yes” is always correct. A special subclass of Monte-
Carlo algorithm is a Las Vegas algorithm which either outputs a correct answer or
reports failure (the latter with probability less than 1/2). The probability of having
a report of failure is prescribed by the user. A detailed comparison of Monte-Carlo
and Las Vegas algorithms, both from practical and theoretical point, can be found
in Babai’s paper [4].
3.2. Constructive recognition. We shall outline an hierarchy of typical black
box group problems.
Verification Problem: Is the unknown group encrypted by a black box
group X isomorphic to the given group G (“target group”)?
Recognition Problem: Determine the isomorphism class of the group en-
crypted by X.
The Verification Problem arises as a sub-problem within more complicated Recog-
nition Problems. The two problems have dramatically different complexity. For
example, the celebrated Miller-Rabin algorithm [43] for testing primality of the
given odd natural number n in nothing else but a black box algorithm for solving
the verification problem for the multiplicative group Z/nZ∗ of residues modulo n
(given by a simple black box: take your favorite random numbers generator and
generate random integers between 1 and n) and the cyclic group Z/(n−1)Z of order
n − 1 as the target group. On the other hand, if n = pq is the product of primes
p and q, the recognition problem for the same black box group means finding the
direct product decomposition
Z/nZ∗ ∼= Z/(p− 1)Z⊕ Z/(q − 1)Z
which is equivalent to factorization of n into product of primes.
The next step after finding the isomorphism type of the black box group X is
Constructive Recognition: Suppose that a black box group X encrypts a
concrete and explicitly given group G. Rewording a definition given in [21],
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The goal of a constructive recognition algorithm is to construct an
effective isomorphism Ψ : G −→ X. That is, given g ∈ G, there
is an efficient procedure to construct a string Ψ(g) encrypting g
in X and given a string x produced by X, there is an efficient
procedure to construct the element Ψ−1(x) ∈ G encrypted by X.
However, there are still no really efficient constructive recognition algorithms for
black box groups X of (known) Lie type over a finite field of large order q = pk. The
first computational obstacles for known algorithms [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 35] are
the need to construct unipotent elements in black box groups, [19, 20, 21, 23, 22, 25]
or to solve discrete logarithm problem for matrix groups [27, 28, 35].
Unfortunately, the proportion of the unipotent elements in X is O(1/q) [31].
Moreover the probability that the order of a random element is divisible by p is
also O(1/q), so one has to make O(q) (that is, exponentially many, in terms of the
input length O(log q) of the black boxes and the algorithms) random selections of
elements in a given group to construct a unipotent element. However, this brute
force approach is still working for small values of q, and Kantor and Seress [33]
used it to develop an algorithm for recognition of black box classical groups. Later
the algorithms of [33] were upgraded to polynomial time constructive recognition
algorithms [20, 21, 22, 23] by assuming the availability of additional oracles:
• the discrete logarithm oracle in F∗q , and
• the SL2(q)-oracle.
Here, the SL2(q)-oracle is a procedure for constructive recognition of SL2(q); see
discussion in [21, Section 3].
We emphasize that in this and subsequent papers we are
using neither the discrete logarithm oracle in F∗q nor the
SL2(q)-oracle.
3.3. On oracles and revelations: an example from even characteristic.
We have to admit that the concept of constructive recognition modulo the use
of unrealistically powerful oracles makes us uncomfortable. We feel that the use
of excessively powerful and blunt tools leads to loss of essential (and frequently
very beautiful) theoretical details. Instead, we propose to use all “fifty shades of
black” and exploit all available gradations of black (that is, a subtler hierarchy of
complexity of black box problems) in development of practically useful algorithms.
Our papers [12, 15, 16] provide a number of concrete examples where this alternative
approach has happened to be fruitful.
In the present paper, we wish to dispel some mystic of the SL2(q)-oracle by
analyzing the structure of the black box group X encrypting SL2(2
n) using formally
a more modest assumption: that we are given an involution r ∈ X. We shall
say that r is obtained by revelation, to acknowledge that this assumption is quite
unnatural in practical applications.
Still, we feel that there is a difference between a revelation or epiphany (which,
by their nature, are non-reproducible, unique events) and an appeal to an oracle;
indeed, there is an implicit assumption that the oracle can be approached for advice
again and again.
Theorem 3.1 (Small characteristic). Let X be a black box group encrypting SL2(2
n)
for some (perhaps unknown) n. We assume that we are given an involution u ∈ X.
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Then there exists a Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs, in polynomial in
l(X) time,
• a black box field U encrypting F2n , and
• a polynomial in l(X) time isomorphism
Φ : SL2(U) −→ X.
3.4. Structure recovery. Theorem 3.1 is an example of a class of results which
we call structure recovery theorems.1
Suppose that a black box group X encrypts a concrete and explicitly given group
G = G(Fq) of Chevalley type G over a explicitly given finite field Fq. To achieve
structure recovery in X means to construct, in probabilistic polynomial time in
log |G|,
• a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
• a probabilistic polynomial time morphism
Ψ : G(K) −→ X.
This new concept requires a detailed discussion.
Recall that simple algebraic groups (in particular, Chevalley groups over finite
fields) are understood in the theory of algebraic groups as functors from the category
of unital commutative rings into the category of groups; most structural properties
of a Chevalley group are encoded in the functor; the field mostly provides the
flesh on the bones. Remarkably, this separation of flesh from the bones is very
prominent in the black box group theory. Here, we wish to mention a few from
many constructions from our subsequent paper [15] which illustrate this point.
Theorem 3.2 (Known characteristic). [15] Let X be a black box group encrypting
the group SLn(q
2) for q odd, q = pk for some k (perhaps unknown) and a known
prime number p. Then we can construct, in time polynomial in log q and n, a black
box group Y encrypting the group SUn(q) and a morphism Y ↪→ X. If in addition
n is even and n = 2m, we can do the same with a black box group Z encrypting
Sp2m(q) and a morphism Z ↪→ Y .
An important feature of the proofs of this and other similar results in [15] is that
they never refer to the ground fields of groups and do not involved any computations
with unipotent elements. In fact, we interpret morphisms between functors
Sp2m(·) ↪→ SUn(·) ↪→ SLn(·2).
within our black boxes.
This example shows that a modicum of categorical language is useful for the
theory as well as for its implementation in the code since it suggests a natural
structural approach to development of the computer code.
Another example of a “category-theoretical” approach is provided by a very
elementary, but also very important observation that the graph of a group homo-
morphism G −→ H is a subgroup of G ×H. Therefore it is natural to identify a
morphism µ : X −→ Y of black box groups with its graph M < X×Y . In its turn,
the black box M is a morphism M −→ X × Y . In practice this could mean (al-
though in some cases a more sophisticated construction is used) that we take some
1We extend our definition from [12] where it refers to a special case of the present one.
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strings x1, . . . , xk generating X and their images y1 = µ(x1), . . . , yk = µ(xk) in Y
and use the product replacement algorithm to run a black box for the subgroup
M = 〈(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉 6 X × Y
which is of course exactly the graph { (x, µ(x)) } of the homomorphism µ. Random
sampling of the black box M returns strings x ∈ X with their images µ(x) ∈ Y
already attached. This doubles the computational cost of the black box for X, but
allows us to do constructions like the following one.
Theorem 3.3 (Known characteristic). [15] Let X be a black box group encrypting
the group SL8(F ) for a field F of (unknown) odd order q = p
k but known p = charF .
Then we can construct, in time polynomial in log |F |, a chain of black box groups
and morphisms
U ↪→ V ↪→W ↪→ X
that encrypts the chain of canonical embeddings
G2(F ) ↪→ SO7(F ) ↪→ SO+8 (F ) ↪→ SL8(F ).
Again, these our constructions (and even the embedding 3D4(q) ↪→ SO+8 (q3),
also done in [15]) are “field-free” and, moreover, “characteristic-free”.
Another aspect of the concept of “structure recovery” is that it follows an impor-
tant technique from the model-theoretic algebra: interpretability of one algebraic
structure in another, see, for example, [10]. Construction of a black box field in
a black box group in Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 closely follows this model-theoretic
paradigm.
3.5. Black box fields. We define black box fields by analogy with black box
groups, the reader may wish to compare the exposition in this section with [8].
A black box (finite) field K is an oracle or an algorithm operating on 0-1 strings
of uniform length (input length) which encrypts a field of known characteristic p.
The oracle can compute x + y, xy and compares whether x = y for any strings
x, y ∈ K. We refer the reader to [8, 38] for more details of black box fields and their
applications to cryptography.
In this paper, we shall be using some results about the isomorphism problem
of black box fields [38], that is, the problem of constructing an isomorphism and
its inverse between K and an explicitly given finite field Fpn . The explicit data
for a finite field of cardinality pn is defined to be a system of structure constants
over the prime field, that is n3 elements (cijk)
n
i,j,k=1 of the prime field Fp = Z/pZ
(represented as integers in [0, p − 1]) so that Fpn becomes a field with ordinary
addition and multiplication by elements of Fp and multiplication is determined by
sisj =
n∑
k=1
cijksk,
where s1, s2, . . . , sn denotes a basis of Fpn over Fp. The concept of explicitly given
field of order pn is robust; indeed, Lenstra Jr. has shown in [36, Theorem 1.2]
that for any two fields A and B of order pn given by two sets of structure con-
stants (aijk)
n
i,j,k=1 and (bijk)
n
i,j,k=1 an isomorphism A −→ B can be constructed in
polynomial in n log p time.
Maurer and Raub [38] proved that the isomorphism problem for a black box
field K and an explicitly given field Fpn is reducible in polynomial time to the same
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problem for the prime subfield in K and Fp. Hence, for small primes p, one can
construct an isomorphism between K and Fpn in time polynomial in n log p and
linear in p.
In our construction of a black box field, we use the so called primitive prime
divisor elements in the field of size pn. A prime number r is said to be a primitive
prime divisor of pn − 1 if r divides pn − 1 but not pi − 1 for 1 6 i < n. By [51],
there exists a primitive prime divisor of pn−1 except when (p, n) = (2, 6), or n = 2
and p is a Mersenne prime. Here, we shall note that the Mersenne primes which
are less than 1000 are 3, 7, 31, 127. We call a group element a ppd(n, p)-element if
its order is odd and divisible by a primitive prime divisor of pn − 1.
4. Application of Frobenius maps: structure recovery of (P)SL2(q),
q ≡ 1 mod 4
We remind that in all theorems and conjectures stated in this paper, we assume
that black boxes for groups satisfy Axioms BB1–BB4; in particular, they come with
known and computationally feasible global exponent (Axiom BB4).
For the structure recovery of (P)SL2(q), we need to recall the Steinberg gener-
ators of (P)SL2(q) as introduced by Steinberg [44, Theorem 8]. We use notation
from [12].
Let G = SL2(q). Then set the Steinberg generators of G as
u(t) =
[
1 t
0 1
]
, v(t) =
[
1 0
t 1
]
, h(t) =
[
t 0
0 t−1
]
, n(t) =
[
0 t
−t−1 0
]
where t ∈ Fq and in addition t 6= 0 in h(t) and n(t).
The group PSL2(q) is obtained from SL2(q) by factorizing over the relation
h(t) = h(−t).
Abusing notation, we are using for elements in PSL2(q) the same matrix notation
as for their pre-images in SL2(q).
It is straightforward to check that
u(t)n(s) = v(−s−2t), u(1)h(t) = u(t−2) and n(1)h(t) = n(t−2).(2)
Moreover,
n(t) = u(t)v(−t−1)u(t) and h(t) = n(t)n(−1).(3)
It is well-known that
G = 〈u(t),v(t) | t ∈ Fq〉,
see, for example, [24, Lemma 6.1.1]. Therefore, by (2) and (3),
G = 〈u(1),h(t),n(1) | t ∈ F∗q〉;
notice that actually G is generated by three elements
G = 〈u(1),h(t),n(1)〉
where we can take t as an arbitrary ppd(k, p)-element of the field Fpk .
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Small characteristic). Let X be a black box group encrypting the
group G ∼= (P)SL2(q), where q ≡ 1 mod 4 and q = pk for some k > 1 (perhaps
unknown). If p 6= 5, 7, then there is a Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs, in
time quadratic in p and polynomial in log q,
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• a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
• a quadratic in p and polynomial in log q time isomorphism
Φ : (P )SL2(K) −→ X.
If p = 5 or 7, and k has a small divisor `, the same result holds where the running
time is polynomial in log q and quadratic in p`.
Theorem 4.1 is used in our paper [13] as the basis of recursion in the proof of the
following structure recovery theorem for classical groups in small characteristics.
Theorem 4.2 (Small characteristic). [13] Let X be a black box group encrypting one
of the classical groups G(q) ' (P)SLn+1(q), (P)Sp2n(q), Ω2n+1(q) or (P)Ω+2n(q),
where q ≡ 1 mod 4 and q = pk for some k > 1 (k and the type of the group are
perhaps unknown).
If p 6= 5, 7, then there is a Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs, in time
quadratic in p and polynomial in log q,
• a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
• a quadratic in p and polynomial in log q time isomorphism
Φ : G(K) −→ X.
If p = 5 or 7, and k has a small divisor `, the same result holds where the running
time is polynomial in log q and quadratic in p`.
4.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1, general case. Our aim is to present an algorithm
which produces a black box field K and an isomorphism
ϕ : SL2(K)→ X.
(1) We use Theorem 2.3 as applied to our black box group X, so u, h, n are
string in X such that
Φ(u) =
[
1 1
0 1
]
,Φ(h) =
[
t 0
0 t−1
]
,Φ(n) =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
for some abstract isomorphism
Φ : X −→ (P)SL2(q);
here, t is some primitive element in Fq, q = pk. We shall note that we only
know the existence of the map Φ. Let h˜ be a ppd(k, p)-element produced
by taking some power of h and
Φ(h˜) =
[
t˜ 0
0 t˜−1
]
.
(2) We consider the cyclic subgroup T = 〈h˜〉 and the unipotent subgroup U =
〈uT 〉 in X. Observe that U is the full unipotent subgroup of X since the
order of h˜ is a ppd(k, p)-element in Fpk .
(3) Now we start introducing on U a structure of field K isomorphic to Fq.
First, for any u1, u2 ∈ U , we define an addition on K by setting
u1 ⊕ u2 = u1u2.
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For the multiplication on K, we set the element u as the unity of K. Since h˜
is a ppd(k, p)-element, it has odd order m and the element
√
h˜ := h˜(m+1)/2
has the property that
√
h˜
2
= h˜. We also set
s := u
√
h˜.
Notice that
[
1 1
0 1
] √t˜ 0
0
√
t˜−1

=
[
1 t˜−1
0 1
]
.
Hence s can be seen as an element in K corresponding to t˜−1, and after
setting si = u(
√
h˜)i , the elements
s, s2, . . . , sk−1, sk
form a polynomial basis of K over the prime field L ' Fp. The additive
groups of L is cyclic of order p. We have already fixed the identity element
1 of K and hence of L, which uniquely defines the multiplicative structure
on L.
For w ∈ U , we define the product
w ⊗ sl = whl
and expanded by linearity to product of any two elements in K. We still
do not know, however, why this operation can be carried out in feasible
time—but we should be reassured that at least the product w ⊗ sl can
be computed in time polynomial in log q. So at this stage we treat K a
partially polynomial time black box field: random generation, comparison,
and addition of elements in K can be carried out in polynomial in log q,
as well as multiplication of an arbitrary element in K by some specific
elements.
(4) In view of Theorem 2.4, we have the Frobenius map φ on our black box
group X ' (P)SL2(q) which leaves U and T invariant and induces the
Frobenius map F on U . This allows us to introduce on U the Frobenius
trace Tr : U → Fp
Tr(x) = x⊕ xF ⊕ xF 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xFk−1
and the trace form, that is, the non-degenerate symmetric Fp-bilinear form
given by
〈x, y〉 = Tr(x⊗ y).
It is interesting that the Frobenius map and the trace form of our future
black box field are introduced before the field multiplication!
We do not know yet whether the evaluation of the trace form on K is
computationally feasible, but we can compute in polynomial in log q time
the values w⊗ sl = whl and of 〈w, sl〉 for arbitrary w ∈ K and powers of s.
In particular, this allows us to compute the matrix of the trace form
A = (aij)k×k, ai,j = 〈si, sj〉, i, j,= 1, 2, . . . , k.
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(5) We are now in position to introduce in K an explicit structure of a L vector
space by computing the decomposition of an arbitrary element w ∈ K with
respect to the basis s, s2, . . . , sk. Indeed, for an arbitrary element w ∈ K,
set
w = α1s⊕ α2s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αksk
and
βj = 〈w, sj〉, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
The coefficients βj are computable in time polynomial in log p and k:
βj = 〈w, sj〉 =
k∑
i=1
αiaij ,
which in matrix notation becomes
(β1, . . . , βk) = (α1, . . . , αk) ·A,
and therefore
(α0, . . . , αk−1) = (β0, . . . , βk−1) ·A−1.
(6) We can now decompose products si⊗sj with respect to the basis s, s2, . . . , sk
and thus find the structure constants cijl for this basis:
si ⊗ sj =
k∑
l=1
cijls
l.
Of course now we are in position to multiply any two elements in K, and,
as we can easily see, in time polynomial in log q. Now, we shall use the
algorithms in [1, 36, 38] to construct the isomorphism between Fpk and K,
see discussion in Section 3.5.
(7) Now, we construct (P)SL2(K) by using the Steinberg generators, see Section
4. Recall that the element s ∈ K corresponds to the element t˜−1 ∈ Fq where
t˜ is a ppd(k, p)-element in Fq, so s is a ppd(k, p)-element in K. We construct,
in (P)SL2(K), the elements encrypting the strings
u(1),h(s−1),n(1)
by using the isomorphism between the fields Fpk and K constructed in Step
6.
(8) Our first assignments are u(1) 7→ u and h(s−1) 7→ h˜. Now we need to
construct the element in X encrypting the string n(1). Note that the
element n ∈ X, which was constructed in Step 1, need not necessarily be
the element corresponding to n(1). Therefore we shall replace the original
element n by the one that corresponds to n(1). Recall that the elements
u, n ∈ X are indeed computed inside a subgroup isomorphic to (P)SL2(p)
or PSL2(p
2) depending on p ≡ 1 mod 4 or p ≡ −1 mod 4, respectively [12].
For simplicity, we may assume that this subgroup encrypts (P)SL2(p) and
the following computations are carried out in this black box subgroup. Note
that raising the element h to the power so that the resulting element h0
has order (p− 1)/2 and belongs to this subgroup isomorphic to (P)SL2(p).
We compute all v := (u−1)h
k
0n for k = 1, . . . p − 1, and check which of
the elements of the form
uv−1u
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has order 4 (Recall that, by (2) and (3), we have u(1)n(s) = v(−s−2) and
n(t) = u(t)v(−t−1)u(t)). Observe that there are only two elements of the
form uv−1u of order 4 and they correspond to the elements n(1) and n(−1).
Now we need to distinguish n(1) from n(−1). Recall also that, by (2) and
(3), we have
n(1)h(t) = n(t−2),u(1)h(t) = u(t−2),v(1)h(t) = v(t2)
and
(4) n(t−2) = u(t−2)v(−t2)u(t−2).
Now it is easy to see that if one of the elements of the form uv−1u of order
4 corresponds to the Weyl group element n(−1), then Equation (4) is not
satisfied. Hence the Weyl group element hk0n which produces the element
uv−1u satisfying Equation (4) is the desired Weyl group element, say n˜.
(9) Observe that the following map
(P)SL2(K) −→ Y
u(1) 7→ u
h(s−1) 7→ h˜
n(1) 7→ n˜
is an isomorphism.
Notice that the algorithm described above provides a proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.2. A more straightforward treatment of SL2(p). Because of its importance,
we give a streamlined construction of an isomorphism between SL2(p), p ≡ 1 mod 4,
and a black box group X encrypting SL2(p). Notice, in this case, that we may
assume that the field structure of Fp is available. Hence, we shall construct the
elements in X encrypting the images of u(1),h(t) and n(1) where 0, 1 6= t ∈ Fp in
X.
Step 1: Using Theorem 2.3, we select in X a unipotent element u, a toral element
h normalizing the root subgroup containing u, and n a Weyl group element for the
torus containing h. Our fist assignment is u(1) 7→ u.
Step 2: Recall that for a given h(t) we have u(1)h(t) = u(t−2). Assume that
u(t−2) = u(k) = u(1)k for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
Now we check whether uh = uk in X. If not, then some power ` of h has this
property, that is, uh
`
= uk. Observe that ` is necessarily relatively prime to p−1 so
that the resulting element h` generates the torus. We replace h with h` and assign
h(t) 7→ h.
Step 3: Now we compute n(1) by using the same arguments in Step 9 of the
algorithm in Section 4.1. Thus we have an isomorphism
SL2(p) −→ X
u(1) 7→ u
h(t) 7→ h
n(1) 7→ n.
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5. A Revelation and Its Reverberations: Proof of Theorem 3.1
5.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1. We describe an algorithm which produces a black
box field U and an isomorphism
Φ : SL2(U) −→ X.
(1) We take our revelation involution r and consider strongly real elements of
the form rx · r for random x ∈ X, and raising them to appropriate powers,
find an element θ of order 3 inverted by r.
(2) Set v = θr and w = θ2r. Observe that v and w are involutions and
L = 〈θ〉〈r〉 is the dihedral group of order 6.
(3) Observe that all dihedral subgroups of order 6 in X are conjugate in X
and therefore we can assume without loss of generality that L ∼= SL2(2)
encrypts a subfield subgroup of SL2(2
n). In particular, there exist a system
of Steinberg generators of SL2(2
n),
u(t) =
[
1 t
0 1
]
, v(t) =
[
1 0
t 1
]
, h(t) =
[
t 0
0 t−1
]
, n(t) =
[
0 t
t−1 0
]
for t ∈ F2n and t 6= 0 for h(t) and n(t), and such that r, v and n encrypt
u(1), v(1), and n(1), correspondingly.
(4) The standard procedure for construction of centralizers of involutions [9, 18]
produces unipotent subgroups U = CX(r) and V = CX(v). If we set
H = 〈h(t) | t ∈ F2n〉
(warning: this subgroup is not constructed yet) then B+ = UH = NX(U)
and B− = V H = NX(V ) are Borel subgroups in X.
(5) Observe that if x ∈ X is such that ux ∈ U for some 1 6= u ∈ U then x ∈ B.
(6) We can identify action of H on U by conjugation with the action of B/U on
U . Observe that for any two involutions s, t ∈ U there is a unique b¯ ∈ B/U
such that sb¯ = t.
(7) Using the double conjugation trick, we can find, for any given involutions
s and t in U an element x in X (and hence in B) such that sx = t.
This is done in the following way: notice that the exponent of SL2(2
n)
is 2 · (2n − 1)(2n + 1) and therefore if y ∈ X is an element of odd order
than y2
2n−1 = 1. By conjugating s by a random element z ∈ X, find an
involution r = sz such that elements y1 = sr and y2 = rt have odd order.
Then it can be checked directly that
s
(
(sr)2
2n−1)
= r and r
(
(rt)2
2n−1)
= t
and
x = (sr)2
2n−1 · (rt)22n−1
has the desired property sx = t. By the previous point, the coset xU in
B/U is uniquely determined.
(The same idea of “local conjugation” of involutions is used by Ballan-
tyne and Rowley for construction of centralizers of involutions in black box
groups with expensive generation of random elements [32].)
(8) Treating the subgroup B as a black box, we have
U = {x ∈ B | x2 = 1}.
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Therefore after introducing on B a new equality relation
x ≡ y if and only if (xy−1)2 = 1
we get a black box T for the factor group T = B/U . Notice that there is
a natural action of T on U by conjugation and that notation ut for u ∈ U
and t ∈ T is not ambiguous.
(9) Now we construct a black box field U. We start with the multiplicative
group U∗ of U which we define as the graph of the orbit action map of T
onto the orbit rT. Namely, U∗ is the set of all pairs (t, s) with t ∈ T and
s ∈ U r {1} such that rt = s. We define in U multiplication ⊗ by the rule
(t1, u1)⊗ (t2, u2) = (t1ts, rt1t2).
In particular, the element 1 = (1, r) plays the role of the identity element
in U∗.
Then we define the zero element of U as
0 = (1, 1),
set
U = U∗ ∪ {0}
(and use lower case boldfaced letter to denote elements u ∈ U), and define
0⊗ u = u⊗ 0 for all u ∈ U∗.
Finally, we define on U addition ⊕ by setting
0⊕ u = u⊕ 0 = u
u⊕ u = 0
(t1, u1)⊕ (t2, u2) = (t, u1u2)
where in the last line u1 6= u2 (and thus u1u2 6= 1) and t ∈ T is chosen
to send r to u1u2, that is, r
t = u1u2. It follows that the inverse u
−1 of
u = (t, u) 6= 0 with respect to multiplication ⊗ is equal to (t−1, rt−1).
(10) So we have a black box field U interpreted in the Borel subgroup B =
NX(CX(r))) of the black box group X and such that X encrypts SL2(U).
It will be convenient to use traditional notation and denote 1 = u(0), and
write, for elements t ∈ U∗, u = u(t) if t = (t, u). In particular, r = u(1).
This gives us a parametrization of U by elements of the black box field U.
(11) Now we transfer the black box field parametrization from U to V by setting
v(0) = 1 and for setting for non-identity elements v ∈ V
v = v(t) if vw = u(t).
We set further
n(t) = u(t)v(t−1)u(t),
so that this agrees with computation in L ∼= SL2(2), yielding
n(1) = w,
and finally set
h(t) = n(t)n(1).
Notice that
{h(t) | t ∈ U∗} = NX(V ) ∩NX(U)
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is the uniquely determined maximal torus in X normalizing the both V and
U . We denote it by H.
(12) We can now construct an isomorphism
Ψ : SL2(U) −→ X.
First of all, recall that matrices from SL2(U) are quadruples[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
of strings aij generated by black box U, with matrix addition and multipli-
cation defined with respect to operations ⊕ and ⊗.
(a) Notice easy-to-check identities over any field of characteristic 2:
(i) given a, b, and d such that bc = 1, we have[
0 b
c d
]
=
[
0 1
1 0
] [
c 0
0 b
] [
1 bd
0 1
]
;
(ii) for a 6= 0 and ad− bc = 1,[
a b
c d
]
=
[
a 0
0 a−1
] [
1 0
ac 1
] [
1 a−1b
0 1
]
.
(b) Therefore we can map
Ψ :
[
0 b
c d
]
7→ n(1)h(c)u(b⊗ d)
Ψ :
[
a b
c d
]
7→ h(a)v(a⊗ c)u(a−1 ⊗ b).
This is an isomorphism.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
5.2. Other groups of characteristic 2. We expect that Theorem 4.2 is mirrored
by the following conjecture.
Conjecture 5.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting one of the untwisted
Chevalley groups G(2n). We assume that we are given an involution u ∈ X.
Then there is a Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs a polynomial time (in
l(X)) isomorphism
Φ : G(2n) −→ X.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in n and the Lie rank of G(2n).
As a comment to Conjecture 5.1, we formulate here the following easy result.
Theorem 5.2. Let X be a black box group encrypting an untwisted Chevalley group
G(2n) (with n known) and U < X an unipotent long root subgroup given as a black
box subgroup of X. Then there is a polynomial time, in n and Lie rank of G(2n),
Monte-Carlo algorithm which constructs a black box for NX(U) and a black box U
for the field F2n interpreted in the action of NX(U) on U , with U becoming the
additive group of the field U.
The proof of this theorem is an immediate and obvious generalization of Step 8
in the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Section 5. Indeed, it suffices to observe that U is a
TI-subgroup of X (that is, U ∩ Ug = 1 or U for all g ∈ G) and that all involutions
in U are conjugate in NX(U).
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Theorem 5.2 suggests that structure recovery of black box Chevalley groups
G(2n) is likely to share some of the conceptual framework of Franz Timmesfeld’s
classification of groups generated by root type subgroups [45, 46, 47, 48]. If so,
then this will be strikingly similar to the use of Aschbacher’s classical involutions
[2, 3] and root SL2-subgroups in our structural theory of classical black box groups
in odd characteristic [11, 13, 12, 15, 49, 50].
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